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THE INFLUENCE OF EARLY 20th CENTURY PUBLIC IDEOLOGY CRISES ON NAVAL OFFICERS' PROFESSIONAL UPBRINGING

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Abstract. The present article urges at searching and analyzing the reasons and consequences of the revolutionary ideology spread in the Russian society and caused by its activation in the early 20th century and its influence on future Naval officers' professional training process. The authors prove direct dependence of certain significant historical events such as Russo-Japanese War, World War One on the content, ways and methods of academic work in the Russian Empire Naval educational institutions. In the article, the authors put forward and substantiate a hypothesis of the social and historical conditionality of future Naval elite representatives' professional upbringing, providing an opportunity to identify the social and pedagogical conditions of future Naval officers training and go into the views of Russian military leaders on the problem of professional education in conditions of combat emergency and political instability. The reliability of the conclusions made by the authors while conducting the historical and pedagogical analysis is confirmed by Russian military leaders' quotations, as well as numerous references to the military publicist literature of the researched period. The conducted historical and pedagogical analysis acquires a theoretical value due to the growing necessity for a detailed study and updating military pedagogical experience at the present moment in order to preserve the Russian Naval school heritage and educate future command personnel in the spirit of Russian military patriotic traditions.

Key words. Professional education, social and political ideology, military pedagogical concept, Naval educational institutions, educational impact.

Relevance

At the present moment characterized as a period of military and political instability it becomes extremely important to refer to our pedagogical heritage urging at the attempts to study the historical experience and actualize the future Naval officer's upbringing traditions. The heady moments of increasing the revolutionary spirits indicated how important it is to preserve the best military educational traditions which is the only way to bring up the true patriots of our Motherland. Moreover this fact is directly stated in the recent amendments in the Russian Federation law of education in 2021 which makes the problem raised in this article even more relevant.

Materials and methods

Analyzing the future Naval officers' professional training features taking into consideration the interdisciplinarity of the study, it becomes necessary to refer to the principles and methods of various scientific spheres including history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, pedagogy, cultural anthropology, and military science. Thus, the research is methodologically based on the principles of dialectical unity and correlation between the past and the present, as well as the viability of historic legacy creative and rational use in modern conditions. As for the research informational basis it is represented by authentic reports, directives, orders and regulations of the researched chronological period borrowed from archives. A separate group of sources consists of military periodicals such as the newspapers "Krymskij vestnik" ("The Crimean Bulletin"), "Novoe vremja" ("The New Time"), "Perevodchik" ("The Translator"), "Sevastopol'skij vestnik" ("The Sevastopol Bulletin"), and the magazines "Voennyj sbornik" ("Military Collection") and "Morskoj sbornik" ("Marine Collection").

Results

In the history of Russia, such major military and social stresses as being defeated in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and the World War One (1914–1918) provoked certain negative spirits in the military community. Moreover, the situation in this period was further accentuated by a rapidly increasing revolutionary activity which were particularly evident in the Black Sea Fleet, resulted by in the events on the battleship *Potemkin* and cruiser *Ochakov* (1905), as well as the Sevastopol Rebellion led by Lieutenant Schmidt (1905).

All these factors either directly or indirectly caused the set of reforms in the sphere of professional training in Naval educational institutions of not only the south of Russia, but of the entire Russian Empire. On the one hand, the Naval Ministry, made all the efforts to preserve the existing system of training the future Naval personnel. Thus, attempts were targeted at:

- enhancing general education and professional development;
- preserving Naval officer's Code of Morale;
- developing an introductory course of military psychology and pedagogics.

On the other hand, under the influence of the social sentiments, the Naval Ministry finally eliminated all existing social class admission restrictions for Naval candidates, which was a sound decision within the revolutionary tendencies.

However, despite all the positive initiatives and efforts of the Naval elite representatives aimed at preserving the best traditions of Naval officers' professional education being formed during the centuries, the crises caused by ideological changes and the fortifying political contradictions in Russia could not be avoided. The beginning of the 20th century is characterized by growing nihilism among the youths.

For example, the ideology of the "new epoch" objected the positive role of teaching religious subjects in military educational institutions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of lessons scheduled for teaching these subjects was greatly reduced, which was openly declared at the First military pedagogical congress held in St. Petersburg in December 1908.

According to the Academic syllabus the number of lessons of humanities were also considerably reduced: they were replaced by additional physical training classes, which emerged the cadets into stressful conditions and made them unwilling to study or obey the educators' instructions [1].

The revolutionary propaganda, which was actively spreading in the Navy during this period, shook the students' morale; "rebellious" spirits were increasing; debauchery, self-indulgence and promiscuous conduct became more frequent.

In October 1916, the Ministry of Home Affairs Police Department Director A. Vasiliev, represented a report in which he stated that "the revolutionary spirits" in the metropolitan areas, far exceeded the 1905 ones [2]. In the report he expressed the concern that the state of affairs in the major Navy cities could lead to an outbreak of "serious civil disturbances of a purely spontaneous nature" [2, p. 221]. At the same time, the head of the Kronstadt military garrison reported that "in case of disturbances, the troops can turn into being unreliable" [3, p. 103]. One of the most important components of the triad once being firm "For Faith, Tsar, and Fatherland" – the monarchist idea which had been imposed on the future officer since the childhood – was losing its value.

After the events of the Russo-Japanese War, which shook the reputation of the monarchy, one of the leaders of the military campaign, Rear Admiral N. Nebogatov, accused the Maritime Ministry of unsatisfactory management: "it was not worth dying for the St Andrew's Flag of that Russia whose representatives doomed you to certain death" [4, p. 11]. Nevertheless, the officers' loyalty to the monarchist idea could still be traced back to the World War One of 1914–1918, which completely changed the social composition of the officer's society. The same things concerning the officers' loyalty was expressed by the words of the Russian military leader, A. Roediger, who said "... I was brought up in the spirit of faith to monarchy since childhood; on the other hand, I demanded a lot from the monarch himself who must be the state servant and ... put the interests of Russia over all the other ones; as a person he must be flawless" [5, p. 84].

From the very beginning of studying at a Navy school, young men were imposed with the fact that the Navy had to defend the country from all home and foreign enemies. The Emperor was considered to be the symbol of the Fatherland. The monarch, personifying Russia, was a symbolic representation of the idea which was widely used during professional and cultural education of future officers as the representatives of the future Naval elite.

There had to be no doubts that a cadet belonged to the military community and swore the oath of being faithful to the Emperor. The fact that in 1917 many officers swore the oath to keep to the Russian Provisional Government demonstrated that people began to reappraise their values. The strange coincidence was the fact that the paraphrased script of the oath still stuck to the ideas of patriotism, religiosity, and righteousness which was as follows: "I swear on the honor of an officer (soldier) and a citizen, and promise, to God and on my, to be invariably faithful to the Russian State as to my Fatherland" [2, p. 80].

Nevertheless the time-honored Code of military morale was gradually regressing, and despite the fact that the number of nobility among the Naval cadets was still quite high, the applicants demonstrated "a certain weakness of character, excessive irritability and bad temper", which differed them from the people brought up on the Orthodox principles – "courteous, ... with a straight, open and frank look, ... humble, calm, simple and naïve in their answers, and good-natured" [6, p. 95]. The deterioration of the moral and religious microclimate in noble families was a consequence of the social processes taking place in Russia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, associated with the loss of spiritual and moral values by society.

More and more often the military periodicals published the articles of outrageous Naval education criticism. Staff officers, who, in most cases, were the authors of the articles, boldly wrote that although it was demanded that the Naval school "should train their cadets deeply as religious, self-sacrificing and faithful to the Tsar and their Fatherland; strong in body and spirit, physically fit, with a strong will, courageous and decisive character, modest in their needs; demonstrating excellent knowledge and capability of initiative and commitment" [7, p. 13]. However "the Naval cadet schools fail to properly train the military youth so that their graduates, who have completed the studies, were unprepared for further military training, they were not prepared to studying specialized subjects; moreover the graduates did not acquire either modesty, or endurance, or firm will, or even love for their mission; the Naval schools did not provide them with proper general development or motivation to studying..." [8, p. 86].

Moreover there existed a contestable question of why a 19-20-year-old Naval graduate was entrusted with the task of training the privates who had already had some social experience and were on average 21 years old and over, and whether it was reasonable to vest this kind of power in young commanders.

As a result, it all submerged into "an atmosphere of continuous haste, nervousness, and hypocrisy, leaving the true values and duties of secondary school in the fog of oblivion" [7, p. 28].

Due to decaying system of financing the Navy, there appeared a tendency of prevailing material values over the spiritual ones, which inevitably led to the loss of patriotism even among the representatives of the Navy elite.

Another acute problem was that the officers really had a very low salary. Compared to some civilian officials, whose salaries were 150% increased in between 1886 to 1914, the officers' allowances during this period were only 10% raised [9]. The monthly allowance of a junior officer was slightly higher than the wages of an efficient worker, but much lower than the salary of an engineer, lawyer, or doctor. Prince Trubetskoy, doing his military service in 1885, had every reason to conclude that it was "difficult to imagine one's life poorer than the life of a Russian officer" [10, p. 402].

At the time when military service was gradually losing its social prestige, the negative effect was intensified by the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War.

V. Lenin – the leader of the Bolsheviks, wrote, "Port Arthur has capitulated. The moral power of strong empire is crumbling, the prestige of generation, which has not yet had time to properly display itself, is getting tarnished. An entire political system is to hear its verdict" [11, p. 157].

The reasons for Russia's defeat in the war with the Japanese were discussed at various levels. N. Klado, a military sociologist of the late 19th – early 20th centuries, was confident that in order to start a war, one should not only carefully study the geopolitical features of a potential adversary state, but also examine the mentality of its people. He believed that one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian army was the enemy forces underestimation. Analyzing the consequences of the Russo-Japanese campaign, A. Leman, a Russian officer and the participant of the events, wrote about the same things in his article “On Naval Schools” published in the “Sevastopolskiy Vestnik” newspaper: “it is necessary to have a solid Navy controlled by a firm smart mind of those who know and, most importantly, love their difficult and dangerous work, who are familiar with their yellow opponents not only in appearance, but in their way of life, thoughts, and religion, who know every nook of the Yellow Waters and love this distant and often inhospitable East Coast” [12, p. 3].

The Japanese themselves testified to the fact that: “Little Japan, thanks to its school and teachers, is crushing Russia the Giant with its ignorant multimillion peasant kingdom. Can our soldier be compared to the Russian soldier? The Japanese soldier is a citizen who consciously loves his country, he is well aware of the background of the war, he knows the politics of his government and he fully agrees with them. Our soldier is literate and has an excellent military training, he is brave, smart, knows the first aid and basic hygiene rules and so he is clean, he knows how to obey and die; any instructions, no matter how difficult they may be, are fulfilled by him with valor and without complaint. The Russians expected to find us depressed because of upcoming difficulties of the war, timid and fleeing after their first attack, but we have not retreated a single step and we are only moving forward!” [13, p. 104]. According to Japanese politicians, the defeat of the Russians was the result of the Russian army underestimating their enemy.

As far as N. Klado, he emphasizes the importance of a certain national psychological type for patriotic education, especially a military one.

L. Tolstoy, a Russian writer, approved N. Klado's opinion expressing his approval the following way, “Yes, many people are delighted with the war, but Klado writes that the defeat of the Russians was caused by their reluctance to military education and their contempt for warfare science” [14, p. 30].

However, even the most progressive part of military staff objected the existence of this science, and therefore the officers still remained absolutely indifferent to studying scientific issues. In October 1906, after the Russo-Japanese War, which was devastating for Russia, the “Kutlin” newspaper published an article entitled “Some lessons from the battles of Shantung and Tsushima” where one of the combatants, a Naval officer, sneered, “Why should Navy and Army staff go into the specialties of military science when, in reality, the whole thing is much simpler. Would Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Peter the Great, Alexander Suvorov, and others pass entrance examinations to a military school, not even mentioning the General Staff Academy? Nevertheless, their names are inscribed in history as immortal examples of war art” [15, p. 5]. In fact, “military equipment, which was rapidly improving from year to year, was given into the hands of the officers who were comparatively military ignorant” [16, p. 7].

On the contrary, military theorist and psychologist M. Dragomirov, expressing his views on the attempts to introduce the Prussian system of training to the Russian army argued that the system of education should be based on the deep knowledge of the Russian warrior's national traits, and not on imitating the systems of foreign armies. [17, p. 110]. M. Dragomirov was firmly convinced that in order to overcome the combat situation difficulties, a true officer needed strong moral and physical qualities, skills and habits that were to be developed while studying at a Naval school.

One of the Russo-Japanese War participants V. Kostenko, being guided by the philosophical principle that “in any war, its final is determined by its beginning”, gave a clear definition of military education prospect: “A mariner must think quickly. Muscles lost their leading role. Without technical training and knowledge, a mariner is not fit for maintaining the equipment he is entrusted with” [18, p. 62]. This certainly stood for immediate introduction tactics as an academic subject to the Navy schools Syllabus.

Pondering over the mental component of the educational process, N. Klado insisted on the necessity of studying Navy history. Discussion of such question as cadets' upbringing and whether it is important to study military history was based on the concept of "common sense" which he defines as "the ability to correctly evaluate the situation, in which one has to act, and the ability to thus deduce the correct actions" [14, p. 28].

Unfortunately, the ideas proposed at the beginning of the 20th century by N. Klado concerning the introduction of fundamental changes into Naval educational institutions curriculum were not brought to life.

The pre-revolutionary period (1916-1917) was also destabilizing, which largely influenced to reducing the military training level. Firstly, since February 1916, all inconscripted teachers were obliged to participate in war actions. The most illogical was the decision to commission the teachers responsible for upbringing process.

Issued August 7, 1917, the special Order on the restructuring Naval schools into secondary schools under the Military Department cancelled the rule of compulsory wearing the military uniform which directly reduced the discipline and led to the perception that they no longer belonged to military community [19].

This decision was highly criticized by the officers – adherents of the "old" regime. Among the first to make negative comments was General M. Dragomirov who always paid a lot of attention to the so-called "trifles" of military service and life. Military ceremonies, in his opinion, make soldiers and officers always look neat and smart, "look around for superiors and be constantly ready to carry out their duties" [17, p. 108]. He demanded that officers should always respond to the officer's salutes, and pointed out that "whoever does not respond to a salute, thus shows that he was less well-mannered than a soldier" [17, p. 110].

It is of no coincidence that General Dragomirov emphasized the unity of upbringing and education, and tried to convey to the representatives of the officer class that "all the components of upbringing are of educational value" [20, p. 8]. But at the same time, he pointed out that upbringing and education "should be arranged in such a way that in a soldier's life and occupations, as well as in his service and actions, the moral qualities acquired while upbringing through discipline should prevail over those formed through education" [20, p. 9].

Unfortunately, the wartime conditions and growing revolutionary sentiments did not contribute well to the old-time system of professional training, which, in particular, was expressed in the decrees and resolutions of Provisional Government. However, the training process transformation had to be executed by the beginning of the 1917-1918 academic year, although the development of new curriculums was postponed for an uncertain period [21].

A. Kolchak, the Black Sea Fleet Commander-in-Chief, evaluated the state of the fleet on the eve of the February Revolution: "The first task is to restore the spirit and fighting efficiency of the army and Navy that have lost them, it is the way to restore discipline and proper management, and to discourage the vanity and ignorance" [22, p. 145].

Unfortunately, military training and upbringing ideas and traditions got under the fierce criticism of people who frequently had no pedagogical education. The training system submerged into oblivion for several decades.

Conclusion

So, having conducted the historical and pedagogical analysis the authors managed to prove that the first thing to be preserved in the period of ideological crises are the moral values. Also the technological factor made a great impact on the pedagogical views and ideas and caused serious maritime education reformation including the necessity of founding extra educational establishments of military professional training and introducing special technical subjects. Several Russian military leaders have been working on creating the effective doctrine having called it the Navy strategy and tactics, trying to define some basic principles of it coming to a conclusion that:

- doctrine must be meaningful and multifunctional;

- all the military and social institutions should be concentrated on upbringing highly moral, honest and noble warriors.

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ВЛИЯНИЕ КРИЗИСА ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЙ ИДЕОЛОГИИ НАЧАЛА XX В. НА ПРОЦЕСС ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНОГО ВОСПИТАНИЯ ВОЕННО-МОРСКИХ ОФИЦЕРОВ

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Аннотация. В данной статье осуществляется поиск и анализ причинно-следственных связей между формирующейся в российском обществе идеологией, связанной с активизацией революционных настроений периода начала XX столетия, и ее влияния на процесс профессионального воспитания будущих офицеров военно-морского флота. Авторы аргументируют факты прямой зависимости ряда значимых исторических событий, таких как русско-японская война и Первая мировая война, на содержание, формы и методы воспитательной работы в военно-морских учебных заведениях Российской империи. В статье авторы выдвигают и обосновывают гипотезу о социально-исторической обусловленности процесса профессионального воспитания будущих представителей военно-морской элиты, предоставляющей возможность выявить социально-педагогические условия подготовки будущих морских офицеров, а также анализируют взгляды отечественных военных педагогов на проблему профессионального воспитания учащихся военно-морских учебных заведений в условиях повышенной боевой готовности и политической нестабильности. Достоверность выводов, сделанных авторами в ходе осуществления историко-педагогического анализа, подтверждается цитатами российских военачальников, а также многочисленными ссылками на военно-периодическую печать заявленного в статье периода. Проведенный историко-педагогический анализ обладает теоретической ценностью в связи с нарастающей на современном этапе необходимостью детального изучения и актуализации военно-педагогического опыта в целях сохранения наследия российской военно-морской школы и воспитания будущих командных кадров в духе отечественных военно-патриотических традиций.

Ключевые слова. Профессиональное воспитание, общественно-политическая идеология, военно-педагогическая концепция, военно-морские учебные заведения, воспитательное воздействие.